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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (e) (i) (Supp. 1992)

1

Amendment V, United States Constitution

1

Amendment XIV, United States Constitution . . . . . .

1

iv

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 910444
Priority No. 2

GARY LEE MABE,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1992) whereby the Utah Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over appeals involving a conviction of a first
degree felony.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment V, due process clause, to the Constitution of the
United States provides:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .
Amendment XIV, due process clause, of the Constitution of
the United States provides:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue,

Under the totality of circumstances, was the

confession involuntary and admitted in violation of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution?
Standard of Review.

The determination of whether a

confession was voluntary involves a question of law which is
reviewed independently by this Court for correctness.

State v.

Sinaer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah App. 1991); Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S.

, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

"It is

the duty of the appellate court . . . 'to examine the entire record
and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of
voluntariness.'"

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah

1988) (quoting Beckwith v. United States. 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96
S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated January 9, 1991, the State charged
Gary Mabe with Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony.
R. 8-9.
On May 20, 1991, the district court heard Mr. Mabe's Motion
to Suppress statements made to Detectives Chuck Oliver and John
Johnson on January 7, 1991 on the basis that they were involuntarily
made, in violation of his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights.
R. 36, 37; see Addendum A for copy of Defendant's memorandum in
support of his Motion to Suppress.

Following an evidentiary hearing

and submission of memoranda by counsel, the district court denied
- 2
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the motion.

R. 64, 65, 66, 70. See Addendum B for copy of

"Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law."
On June 24, 1991, Mr. Mabe entered a conditional plea of
guilty to second degree murder; he explicitly preserved his right to
appeal the trial judge's ruling on the suppression motion.
Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

State v.

R. 71, 94 p.3.

The trial judge sentenced Mr. Mabe to a term of five years to life
at the Utah State Prison.

R. 9.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early morning hours of December 5, 1990, the body of
Carol Mabe, Appellant's wife, was discovered at her place of
employment, Timesaver Industrial, Inc., by a fellow employee.

R. 9.

On January 4, 1991, approximately one month after Carol
Mabe's death, Mr. Mabe reported to the police station in the Public
Safety Building in downtown Salt Lake City at 1:30 p.m. to answer
questions concerning Carol Mabe's death.

Tr.l p. 68.! When

Mr. Mabe arrived at the Public Safety Building, he was placed in a
small interrogation room, where he sat at the end of the table
farthest from the door.

A detective was seated adjacent to him on

each side, effectively blocking his access to the door.

Mr. Mabe

1. Tr.l refers to the transcript of the January 4, 1991
interrogation. Tr.2 refers to the transcript of the January 7, 1991
interview. Videotapes of the two interrogations are also part of
the record on appeal. The transcripts of the interrogations were
submitted to facilitate review by the trial court and this Court.
R. 93 is the entire transcript of the hearing on the motion to
suppress which was held May 20, 1991.
- 3

-

was subjected to nearly three hours of questioning.

Near the end of

the interrogation, Mr. Mabe was left alone in the room for
approximately ten minutes to "think.11

Tr.l pp. 95-96.

At no time

was Mr. Mabe informed of his Miranda rights, provided with drink or
use of the restroom.

Videotape 1.

Comments of the detectives

indicated that Mr. Mabe, an alcoholic, had been drinking prior to
the interrogation.

Tr.l pp. 47, 48, 51, 81.

During the course of the interrogation, Mr. Mabe repeatedly
informed the detectives that he no longer wished to talk to them
and, at one point, asked if he was free to leave.2
44-5, 48, 71, 77, 85.

Tr.l pp. 29, 34,

The detectives did not terminate the

questioning in response to Mr. Mabe's statements.

Approximately one

hour into the interview, Detective Oliver informed Mr. Mabe that
Mr. Mabe was the principal suspect.

Tr.l p. 1.

The detectives implied that Mr. Mabe could "work this out"
as he had done in the "Brinks Deal."3

2.

During the hearing, the

Illustrative of such statements by Mr. Mabe are the following:
Mabe: You know, if you're just goin' sit here
and harass me, no offense, but that's all you're
doing right now, is harassing me, I'm not saying
another word. I mean I'm just tired of hearin'
that. I did not kill my wife! And I'm tired of
hearing it!

Tr.l p. 71.
Mabe: I'm not admitting to it 'cause I didn't do
it. And I'm not saying nothing else. I don't
appreciate this at all.
Tr.l p. 77.
3.

Footnote on next page.
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detectives acknowledged that they knew that Mr. Mabe had been
sentenced to probation on the Brinks matter and that a theft is
treated very differently from a homicide.

R. 32, 36, 93.

During

the initial interrogation, the detectives articulated promises of
leniency on several occasions.4

They also implied threats of

3. Mr. Mabe was involved in a theft from his employer, the Brinks
Company, in 1985. That felony charge was resolved when Mr. Mabe
reported to the police on his own volition, and as a result of a
plea agreement, Mr. Mabe received probation. Mr. Mabe was
incarcerated less than five days for that conviction. S. 5, 43;
R. 93 pp. 31-3.
4. The following are examples of the officers' suggestions of
leniency:
Detective Oliver: Okay, just like the Brinks
deal. We're here to help you and we're willing
to help you, okay?
Tr.l p. 26.
Detective Oliver: At Brinks you accepted the
responsibility and things worked out for you.
Tr.l p. 38.
Detective Oliver: You had the man in you to fess
up to that [the Brinks theft] and things worked
out for you. Things can work out here, too, Gary.
Tr.l p. 56,
Detective Oliver: . . . Do you feel you did the
right thing on the Brinks deal? Would you do it
any different if you had another out of it?
Things worked out for you right?
Mabe:

Yeah.

Detective Oliver: Well, I think things could
work out for you again if you'll tell us the
truth.
Tr.l pp. 18-19.
- 5
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harsher charges if Mr. Mabe did not confess.

Tr.l pp. 18, 21, 26,

38, 40, 42, 56, 86, 90, 91, 97. 5

5. The following statements are illustrative of the promises/
threats stated during the course of the Friday interrogation:
Detective Oliver: . . . If [Detective Johnson]
gets one little piece of evidence, you know, he's
going to go to the District Attorney and say
"I've been working on this for two years. I
finally got that SOB and now I'm going to charge
him," where now, today, if we can take care of it
today, we can help you and we want to help you,
okay?
Tr.l p. 39. Detective Oliver then reiterated that Detective Johnson
would not have the same feelings if he had to work two years to
break the case.
Detective Oliver: I want to help you . . . make
it as easy on you as possible. I want to do that
right now, Gary, but you know, [Detective
Johnson] wants to do it. The kids want to do
it. You've got a lot of support, Gary, but if
you're going to rebuff that, you're going to buck
that support, we can't help you Gary, you know,
and we want to help you . . . But now's the time
to let us help you, 'cause you know, a year from
now or two years from now, we're not going to be
able to help you.
Tr.l p. 42.
Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you
if the degree of the crime we charges with charge
you with weighs a bit on what you tell us, how
you cooperate with us. You know if it takes me a
year, two years, whatever I'm going to solve this
sucker.
Mabe:

I understand.

Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you,
if it's the hard way, I mean I'm going to sock it
to you.
Tr.l p. 56.
(continued)
- 6
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Throughout the interview, Mr. Mabe denied any involvement
or knowledge of his wife's death.

At the termination of the

interrogation, Detective Johnson stated, "Like I say were not going
to forget this, think about it.

Then get ready to clear your

conscience, call us (inaudible) if you need some help."

Tr.l p. 98.

After returning home from the interrogation, Mr. Mabe
attempted to call the detectives; however, dispatch refused to
contact them because they were off duty.

R. 93 pp. 11-12.

(footnote 5 continued)
Detective Oliver: I can understand the drinking,
you know, most people have a drink, but you know,
most people will understand the drinking part of
it cause, you know, it's a grieving part, you
know. What if that jury doesn't buy your story?
You know what your only chance is going to be
then if they convict you is Johnny (Detective
Johnson) because he is the case manager. He can
say you know what? That guy came forward on
January 4 and said ya I did it.
Tr.l p. 57.
Detective Oliver: We're your only salvation, you
know. I'd much rather have me and John on your
side than five people or eight people, or how
ever many they use nowadays, they pick off the
street. Plus that's making a recommendation
saying that on January 4, 1991 . . . .
Detective Johnson: Get it cleared up and make it
easy for all of us.
Tr.l p. 86.
Detective Oliver: If we have to charge you with
second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or
something then, you know, we're going to have to
do what we have to do as you're doing what you
have to do.
Tr.l p. 97.
- 7
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Mr. Mabe

attempted suicide three times over the course of the weekend with
the use of drugs, alcohol and natural gas poisoning.6

Tr.2

pp. 16-17.
On Monday morning, January 7, 1991, Mr. Mabe phoned the
detectives and left a message for them to call him at his home.
S-3, R. 93 p. 9.

The detectives then picked up Mr. Mabe at his West

Valley home and returned him to the Public Safety Building.

In

contrast to the Friday interrogation, the detectives read Mr. Mabe
the Miranda warning, Mr. Mabe was smoking a cigarette, he had a
drink, and he was seated on the side of the table with neither
detective blocking his access to the door; he was also allowed to
use the restroom and contact his brother.

Videotape 2.

Mr. Mabe

provided the detectives with a statement detailing his involvement
in the death of Carol Mabe. Tr.2.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The totality of the circumstances in this case establishes
that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the State had
sustained its burden of establishing the voluntariness of the
statement.

During the Friday interrogation, the officers made

implied promises of lenient treatment, comparing the Brinks matter
in which Appellant had been placed on probation with the instant

6. On Saturday, Mr. Mabe attempted suicide
over-the-counter medication. On Sunday, he
over-the-counter medication with a six pack
Sunday night, Mr. Mabe reversed the vent on
house. Tr.2 pp. 16-17.
- 8
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by taking a bottle of
ingested two bottles of
of beer. Finally, on
the furnace into the

matter, and indicating that "things could work out for [him] again"
if he were to "fess up" and accept responsibility.

The officers

also threatened to file more severe charges if he did not "fess up."
These promises and threats were coupled with the fact that
the detectives did not mirandize Mr, Mabe during the initial
interrogation even though he was a suspect and not free to leave
during that interrogation.

In addition, Appellant's precarious

mental and emotional state, including the fact that he was grieving
over the loss of his wife, attempted suicide during the weekend
between the two interviews, and was an alcoholic who was drinking,
contributed to the lack of voluntariness.
The passage of seventy-two hours was not sufficient to
purge the taint of the earlier interrogation.

The threats and

promises and the implication that things would go easier for
Mr. Mabe if he were to confess then rather than being charged two
years later after the detectives had been made to work hard for the
case carried over throughout the weekend and into the second
interrogation.

ARGUMENT
POINT. MR. MABE'S JANUARY 7. 1991 STATEMENT WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY.
"Certain interrogation techniques . . . are so offensive to
a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned . . . ."
Miller v. Fenton. 474 U.S. 104, 109, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405
(1985).

As a result, confessions obtained through the use of

- 9
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coercive techniques violate an individual's fifth and fourteenth
amendment rights against self-incrimination and due process of law
and therefore are not admissible into evidence.

State v. Griffin.

754 P.2d 965, 971 (Utah App. 1988); Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S.
157, 163, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); State v. Watts. 639
P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981).
The United States Supreme Court has articulated the
underlying rationale for this rule of law:
The abhorrence of society to the use of
involuntary confessions does not turn alone on
the inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on
the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey
the law while enforcing the law; that in the end
life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to
be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves.
Soano v. New York. 360 U.S. 315, 320-1, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d
1265 (1959).
The threshold determination is whether Mr. Mabe's Monday,
January 7, statement was "essentially [the] free and unconstrained
choice [of] its maker."

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218,

226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 862 (1973).

The focus is on whether

the defendant's will was overcome so as to "induce [him] to talk
when he otherwise would not have done so."

State v. Griffin. 754

P.2d at 971, quoting State v. Heaelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah
1986).

Such a determination is to be based on the totality of the

circumstances, including the characteristics of the individual and
the details of the interrogation.

Id. at 226; State v. Strain. 779

P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989); State v. Heaelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1350

- 10 -

(Utah 1986); State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985); State v.
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1991).

The State bears the burden

of demonstrating the voluntariness of the confession by a
preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah

1988).
Coercion need not come in the form of brutal beatings or
prolonged deprivation; subtle psychological coercion is often a much
more effective technique, yet no less abhorrent a method of
obtaining a confession.

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct.

1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959); see also United States v. Tingle, 658
F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).
Mr. Mabe was subject to a " . . . psychological force or
manipulation . . . designed to induce [him] to talk when he
otherwise would not have done so."

State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348

(Utah 1986); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct.
515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).

This psychological force was the result

of the combined effect of the detectives' promises of leniency and
threats of harsher treatment, an unmirandized custodial
interrogation, and manipulation of Mr. Mabe's emotional state.

A. PROMISES AND THREATS MADE BY THE DETECTIVES
SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE OVERALL COERCIVE
EFFECT OF THE FRIDAY INTERROGATION.
"In order for a confession to be admissible, it must be
made freely and voluntarily, it must not be extracted by threats or
violence or obtained by improper influence or promises."

State v.

Watts, 639 P.2d at 160; State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App.

- 11 -

1988); State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986); State v. Moore,
697 P.2d at 236; State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989).

This is

not an absolute rule but rather one of the elements to be considered
in the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding a confession.
Strain, 779 P.2d at 227.
The importance of promises of leniency and threats of
harsher treatment in the totality of the circumstances was addressed
in Bradv v. United States. 397 U.S. 742, 754, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25
L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).

In Bradv. the United States Supreme Court held

that confessions obtained by misrepresentation of promises of
leniency are not per se involuntary if the effect of interrogation
tactics is "dissipated by the presence and advice of counsel."
However, where a confession is taken from an unrepresented suspect
in custody, "even a mild promise of leniency was deemed sufficient
to bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as
such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive to
inducement and the possible impact on them too great to ignore and
too difficult to assess."

Id.

at 754.

In State v. Strain, 779 P.2d at 226, this Court recognized
that "most courts have found a confession involuntary where a threat
to pursue a higher charge if the accused did not confess, or a
promise to pursue a lesser charge if he did confess, was
exhortative.

[citations omitted]."

The defendant in Strain

confessed to the murder of his step-daughter after promises and
threats by a detective.

In the interrogation at issue in that case,

the defendant was informed of his rights, after which the detective
- 12 -

made statements that if the defendant confessed, he would only be
charged with second degree murder, but if he did not confess, he
would be charged with first degree murder and face possible
execution.

The Utah Supreme Court held the detective's statements

to be "impermissibly coercive because they carried a threat of
greater punishment or a promise for a lesser punishment depending on
whether he confessed."
In the present case, the detectives repeatedly suggested
that Mr. Mabe would receive more lenient treatment if he confessed
and that he would be treated more harshly if he did not make a
statement.

The suggestion of more lenient treatment was often made

by comparing the situation to the Brinks matter and implying that
Mr. Mabe would receive treatment similar to that which he received
in the Brinks matter if he were to confess.
56.

Tr.l pp. 18-19, 26, 38,

Examples of such suggestions of more lenient treatment if he

were to confess include the following:
Detective Oliver: . . . Do you feel you did the
right thing on the Brinks deal? Would you do it
any different if you had another out of it?
Things worked out for you right?
Mabe:

Yeah.

Detective Oliver: Well, I think things could
work out for you again if you'll tell us the
truth.
Tr.l pp. 18-19.
Detective Oliver: Okay, just like the Brinks
deal. We're here to help you and we're willing
to help you, okay?
Tr.l p. 26.

- 13 -

Detective Oliver: At Brinks you accepted the
responsibility and things worked out for you.
Tr.l p. 38.
Detective Oliver: You had the man in you to fess
up to that [the Brinks theft] and things worked
out for you. Things can work out here, too, Gary.
Tr.l p. 56.
Even though the detectives knew that Mr. Mabe had received
probation on the Brinks theft and that theft cases are treated in a
markedly different manner than homicide cases without probation as
an option (R. 93 pp. 32, 36), they implied that things would work
out similarly if he were to confess.
The detectives also repeatedly threatened harsher
treatment, including more severe charges, if Mr. Mabe did not
confess.

Examples of such threats include the following:
Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you
if the degree of the crime we charges with charge
you with weighs a bit on what you tell us, how
you cooperate with us. You know if it takes me
one year, two years, whatever I'm going to solve
this sucker.
Mabe:

I understand.

Detective Johnson: And if and when I charge you,
if it's the hard way, I mean I'm going to sock it
to you.
Tr.l p. 56.
Detective Oliver: If we have to charge you with
second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or
something then, you know, we're going to have to
do what we have to do as you're doing what you
have to do.
Tr.l p. 97.
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The trial court found that "during the interview there were
suggestions that the defendant may be charged with a more serious
offense should he refuse to cooperate and that there might be more
lenient treatment should he cooperate."

R. 67, 68. This finding

appropriately reflects the totality of the interrogation.
In State v. Miller. 829 P.2d 131, 134 (Utah App. 1992), a
panel of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that threats of greater
charges and promises of leniency have been found to be coercive.
Threats of possibly greater charges were found to
be coercive in State v. Rhiner. 352 N.W.2d 258,
262-64 (Iowa 1984) (defendant coercively told "he
might be in jeopardy on other charges unless he
cooperated"). Promises of leniency have also
been found to be a coercive factor. United
States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir.
1981) ("promise to seek lenient treatment" is
evidence of coercion).7
See also State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1988) ("In order
for a confession to be admissible, it must be made freely and

7. The Miller Court determined that under the totality of
circumstances, Miller's confession was not involuntary because "the
characteristics of the accused" outweigh any potentially coercive
"details of the interrogation." Miller, 829 P.2d at 135. In
Miller, the defendant had extensive involvement in the criminal
justice system, since he had been to prison twice, jailed four
times, and has had some fifteen encounters with police." Id.
Miller was familiar with interrogation techniques, participated
actively and intelligently in the interrogation process, "and may
have actually initiated and solicited the promise to recommend more
lenient treatment." Id.
By contrast, Mr. Mabe had only one prior experience with
the criminal justice system which resulted in him being placed on
probation for a fairly serious charge after he cooperated with
officials. Although he had some college education, his prior
experience negates any argument that as an intelligent man, he acted
voluntarily. Mr. Mabe was also in a precarious emotional state due
to the death of his wife and his battle with alcoholism. Unlike the
situation in Miller, the officers preyed on this precarious
emotional state during the first interrogation.
- 15 -

voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats or violence or
obtained by improper influence or promises.

[citation omitted].11);

State v. Burr, 615 P.2d 635, 637 (Ariz. 1980) (officer's statement
implying benefit in exchange for information requires suppression).
The repeated reference to the "Brinks deal" by the
detectives and implication that this matter could be resolved in a
like manner created an implied promise that if Mr. Mabe confessed,
the charges could be resolved without a prison term or, at the
least, a minimal sentence.

This implied promise coupled with

threats to charge a more severe crime if he did not confess worked
together to induce the statement given in this case.
Additionally, the detective's suggestion that Mr. Mabe may
not be guilty because the death of his wife may have been a crime of
passion or rage implied that a reduced charge may been appropriate
if Mr. Mabe confessed.

Tr.l pp. 26, 38, 96.

The detectives made

misrepresentations that they had sufficient evidence to present the
case to the County Attorney, in spite of the fact that they had only
minimal circumstantial evidence.

Tr.l pp. 89, 94.

Detective

Johnson testified at the motion hearing that at the time of the
confession, they lacked sufficient evidence to charge Mr. Mabe.
R. 29, 93.

Such misrepresentations by the government resulted in

Mr. Mabe being mislead concerning the consequences of his
confession.

The effect of such a misrepresentation is that "his

statement was unconstitutionally induced by a prohibited direct or
implied promise."

United States v. Goldstein, 611 F.Supp. 626, 632

(D.C. 111. 1985).

See also Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 411-14
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(4th Cir. 1968); Soano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 79
S.Ct. 1202 (1959).
In the present case, the detectives' statements are
particularly egregious and coercive considering they were presented
to Mr. Mabe without the benefit of the Miranda warning or advice of
counsel.

See discussion infra at 17-19.

B. THE ABSENCE OF MIRANDA WARNINGS AT INITIAL
INTERROGATION CONTRIBUTED TO COERCION.
Failure to give Miranda warnings in a custodial
interrogation creates a presumption of coercion.

Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
However, the question of when custody begins is "murky and
difficult."

Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84

L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).
In assessing whether an individual was in custody, the
initial inquiry is whether a "reasonable person" would believe he or
she was free to leave.

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104

S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100,
1104 (Utah App. 1990).
This Court has articulated the following factors to be
considered in determining whether an individual is in custody:
(1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation
focused on the accused, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest
were present, and (4) the length and form of interrogation.

Salt

Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983); see also

- 17 -

State v, Sampson. 808 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Utah App. 1990).
The district court's finding in the present case that
"[d]uring the interview the defendant was never involuntarily
detained or arrested" is not supported by the facts and is clearly
erroneous•

R. 67.

During the initial interrogation, a reasonable person under
the circumstances would have believed s/he was not free to leave.
First, the initial interrogation occurred in an interrogation room
at the police station.8

Although Mr. Mabe reported to the police

station at the request of the detectives, that fact "does not mean
that he was free to leave during the entire remainder of the
interrogation."

Sampson. 808 P.2d at 1105.

On the contrary, the

detectives did not let Mr. Mabe leave when he desired to do so.
Mabe:

Are you going to continue to hold me?

Detective Oliver:

Poor Gary, poor Gary.

Mabe: I mean we can sit here and rehash this
thing over and over and over . . .
Detective Oliver: We might. We might 'til we
get some straight answers from you.
. . .

Mabe: I just see no reason to sit here and
rehash the same thing over and over and over.
Tr.l pp. 44-45.

8.

Mr. Mabe expressed his reaction to the detectives as follows:
Mabe: I guess sometimes your authority
intimidates me as much as it does anybody else.

Tr.l p. 82.
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Second, the investigation had focused on Mr, Mabe.

Early

in the interrogation, the detectives clearly stated that they
believed that Mr. Mabe had caused the death of his wife.
p. 10.9

Tr.l

When investigatory questioning becomes accusatory, as is

the case in the interrogation of Mr. Mabe, "custody is likely."
Sampson. 808 P.2d at 1105; earner, 664 P.2d at 1170.
In addition to the officers' verbal refusal to terminate
the interrogation, the layout of the interrogation also demonstrates
that Mr. Mabe was in custody.

Mr. Mabe was seated at the end of the

room farthest from the door with an officer on either side of him,
blocking his exit to the door.
Finally, the length and form of the interrogation
demonstrate that Mr. Mabe was in custody.

The detectives repeatedly

referred to potential charges and evidence suggesting that Mr. Mabe
had committed the homicide.

Tr.l p. 8.

They also informed him that

he had been "extremely deceptive" at the polygraph examination.
Tr.l p. 9.

Over the course of nearly three hours, Mr. Mabe

repeatedly stated that he did not wish to talk further with the
officers; yet, they persisted in their badgering and interrogation.

9. The following is one of several of the detectives' accusatory
statements:
Johnson: . . . just nothing, nothing else fits.
It points to you.
Tr.l p. 10.
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C. MR. MABE'S MENTAL CONDITION CONTRIBUTED TO
THE COERCIVE NATURE OF THE INTERROGATION.
In determining the "totality of the circumstances"
surrounding the voluntariness of a confession, the "characteristics
of the accused" must be considered as well as the "details of the
interrogation."

Strain. 779 P.2d at 225. Mr. Mabe does not contest

the court's finding that he was "38 years old and appear[ed] in good
health/1 that "he appeared to be lucid and in full control of his
faculties" and that he has some college education and an I.Q. of
127," or that he "had previously entered a guilty plea to the
commission of a felony."

R. 167. However, his emotional and mental

condition combined with the overall circumstance of the Friday
interrogation contributed to the coercive effect of the
interrogation and a continuation of that effect throughout the
weekend.

See United States v. Gordon. 638 F.Supp. 1120 (W.D. La.

1986), cited in Bishop. 753 P.2d at 464, n.75.

These circumstances

combined mitigated the effects of Mr. Mabe's health, intelligence
and prior knowledge of the criminal system.
Mr. Mabe is a recovered alcoholic, who admitted to drinking
during the month following his wife's death and immediately prior to
coming to the police station.

The detectives noted in the

interrogation that they could smell alcohol and that they suspected
that Mr. Mabe had been drinking.

Tr.l pp. 47, 48, 51, 52, 84. In

United States v. Rohrbach. 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied. 482 U.S. 909 (1987), the court held a history of alcohol
abuse "would be relevant to the voluntariness issue."
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Id. at 144.

The effects of Mr. Mabe's alcohol abuse increased his susceptibility
to coercion.

This abuse is indicative of his dependent personality,

which the officers frequently made reference to in the
interrogation.

Tr.l pp. 3, 73/ 74, 97. Officers also repeatedly

brought up Mr. Mabe's history of alcoholism and preyed on his
feelings about his drinking, e.g. Tr. 1, pp. 3, 4, 8, 10, 14, 20,
23, 24, 25.
Mr. Mabe's mental condition was further weakened by the
fact that he was grieving over the loss of his wife and had
considerable financial difficulty.

Mr. Mabe was not working at the

time of the interview and was responsible for a large debt for back
child support.

Tr.l pp. 3, 77. The trial judge recognized the

emotional strain Mr. Mabe was operating under in finding that
Mr. Mabe indicated he had made suicide attempts over the weekend and
made emotional displays during the January 7 interview, both of
which were consistent with remorsefulness and sorrow.

R. 68. All

of these factors contributed to tremendous stress and emotional
instability in Mr. Mabe, who had been dependent upon his wife
financially and emotionally.
Mr. Mabe's mental condition, including the extreme stress
he was under and a history of alcoholism, is "a more significant
factor" in determining voluntariness because of the subtle
psychological coercion employed by the detectives.

Colorado v.

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986).
Unlike the situation in State v. Miller. 829 P.2d at 135,
Mr. Mabe's prior experience with the criminal justice system did not
- 21 -

outweigh the effect of the threats and promises.

Mr. Mabe had less

experience with the criminal justice system than did the defendant
in Miller, and Mr. Mabe's only experience had resulted in probation
when he cooperated.
The overall impact of the first interview was to
communicate to Mr. Mabe that he would be treated more harshly if he
did not confess and given lenient treatment if he did.

These

threats and promises coupled with Mr. Mabe's characteristics
demonstrate the coerciveness of that interview.

D. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHES
THAT MR. MABE'S STATEMENT WAS INVOLUNTARY.
The characteristics of the accused in this case were his
emotional instability, dependence, sorrow, and feelings of remorse
coupled with his history of alcoholism.

These were coupled with his

prior experience with the criminal justice system wherein he was
placed on probation for a fairly serious theft charge because of his
cooperation and voluntary statements.
The details of the first interrogation include repeated
implied promises of lenient treatment if he were to make a
statement, coupled with threats of harsher charges if he did not
confess, and no Miranda warnings.

The totality of these

circumstances establishes the involuntariness of the statement.

E. MR. MABE'S MONDAY, JANUARY 7, 1991,
STATEMENTS WERE TAINTED BY THE COERCIVE EFFECTS
OF FRIDAYS INTERROGATION.

- 22 -

Mr. Mabe did not make a statement during the course of the
coercive January 4 interrogation; rather, he contacted the
detectives on the following Monday morning and made a statement to
them after they read him the Miranda warning.

Neither the passage

of time nor the reading of the Miranda warning sufficiently purged
the taint of the coercive effects of the Friday interrogation.
Mr. Mabe's Monday statements were the direct result and continuing
effect of that interrogation and the detectives' coercive techniques.
Justice Powell has articulated the rationale for the
dissipation of the taint doctrine.
. . . the notion of the "dissipation of the
taint" attempts to mark the point at which the
detrimental consequences of illegal police action
becomes so attenuated that the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its
cost.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416
(1975).

Powell, J.

Concurring, Rehnquist, J.

The following

factors are to be considered when making such a determination:
(a) temporal proximity of the primary illegality, (b) the presence
or absence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and
flagrance of the illegal police conduct.

Id. at 603-4.

See also

State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the effects
of coercion can be purged with the passage of time.

Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 105 S.Ct. 1285
(1985).

See also United States v. Chalan. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.

1987) . However, the facts of the case are not such that seventy-two
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hours was not sufficient time to purge the taint of the detectives'
coercive interrogation.

The interrogation ended with a suggestion

that Mr. Mabe could still benefit if he were to call.

Tr.l p. 98.

Mr. Mabe's phone call to the detectives on Friday night, his
distressed emotional state, and his repeated suicide attempts (all
involving substances which could have impaired his mental
functioning) are indicative of a continuing effect of the
detectives' coercive threats and promises.

Throughout the weekend,

Mr. Mabe focused on the coercive interrogation without the benefit
of being informed of his right to counsel and against
self-incrimination.
The only potentially intervening event, aside from the
passage of time, between the coercive interrogation and Mr. Mabe's
incriminating statement was the reading of the Miranda warning to
Mr. Mabe on Monday morning immediately proceeding his confession.
The Unites States Supreme Court has held that the Miranda warning
following an illegality on the part of the officers may not overcome
the taint of the illegality.

Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,

686, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988); Brown v. Illinois. 422
U.S. 590 ("Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make [a
confession] sufficiently a product of free will to break . . . the
causal connection between [all illegal arrest] and the
confession.11) . 1 0

10. See also State v. Williams. 249 S.E.2d 758 (1978) ("fact that
Miranda warnings were given prior to each confession is not
sufficient standing alone to purge the primary taint").
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In the present case, the reading of the Miranda rights was
"merely a formalizing . . . of what has already taken place."
Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. at 330 (Brennan, J.r dissenting).
Justice Brennan goes on to cite the following persuasive reasoning,
"[t]he giving of the miranda warnings before reducing the product of
the day's work to written form could not undo what had been done or
make legal what was illegal." Id. at 330, quoting People v. Bodner,
75 App. Div.2d 440, 448, 430 N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1980).

The mere

reading of the Miranda warning after the continuing effects of the
coercive interrogation had already overborne Mr. Mabe's free will
did not undo the coercive, continuing effects of the first
interrogation.

Mr. Mabe was still left with the impression that he

would be charged less harshly and receive lenient treatment if he
confessed.
Finally, the court must consider the purpose or flagrancy
of the officers' conduct.

The detectives' purpose in coercing a

statement from Mr. Mabe may have been well intentioned; however, the
public's interest in solving a crime cannot be gained at the expense
of an individual's constitutional right to be free from coercive
tactics.

The detectives interrogated and accused Mr. Mabe of his

wife's murder for almost three hours in an unmirandized custodial
setting.

They made misrepresentations, promises and threats in an

effort to obtain a confession from Mr. Mabe.

The flagrancy of the

police conduct in making such threats and promises, even though they
knew a homicide would ultimately be treated much differently than a
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theft, demonstrates that the taint of the first interview was not
dissipated at the time Mr. Mabe made his statement.

CONCLUSION
Appellant, Gary Lee Mabe, respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress and
remand this case for trial absent the coerced confession.

SUBMITTED this Jt\jtJt day of December, 1992.
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LYNN R. BROWN
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444

Third Judicial District
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ^UD/ICIAL DISTRICT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
v.

:

GARY LEE MABE,

:

Case No. 911000272FS

Defendant.

I.
INTRODUCTION
Gary Mabe urges the Court to suppress statements taken from
him by Salt Lake City Police Officers because those statements were
involuntary.

The involuntariness of statements taken from Mr. Mabe

is manifest from the totality circumstances under which they were
taken.

Promises were made to Mr. Mabe by Detectives John Johnson

and Chuck Oliver to induce a confession.

In addition, these

promises gave the clear suggestion that Mr. Mabe would help himself,
that is, qualify for lenient treatment, if he would confess his
involvement in the crime being investigated.

Mr. Mabe was lead to

believe, and virtually assured, that he would never be in the
situation he is in today, if he implicated himself in this crime.

The appeal of these promises of leniency was enhanced by
the fact that the detectives knew Mr, Mabe had been involved in the
criminal justice system on a previous occasion, that he had
confessed to a felony and received probation.

Detective Oliver told

Mr. Mabe that this charge was "just like the Brinks deal.
willing to help you, okay?"
1991, hereinafter (T. 26).

We're

Transcript of videotape, January 4,
"Uh things worked out on that Brinks

deal, you were smart enough to say, hey, I made a mistake."
42).

(T.

"You had the man in you to fess up to that and things worked

out for you.

Things can work out here too, Gary."

(T. 56).

In addition to the promises of leniency, Mr. Mabe f s
statements were extracted through threats made by Detective
Johnson.

Detective Johnson told Mr. Mabe if he did not confess, he

would be treated with much greater severity.

His suggestion was

that if it took him one or two years to solve the case he would
harsher.

be

Detective Oliver told Mr. Mabe, "If we have to charge you

with second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or something
then, you know, we're going to have to do what we have to do as
you're doing what you have to do."

(T. 97).

The promises and threats made to Mr. Mabe must be viewed in
the context of the totality of the circumstances of the
interrogation.
considered.

Mr. Mabe's physical and mental condition must be

In addition, the length and nature of the interrogation

must be considered.

The circumstances, viewed in their totality,

demonstrate an interrogation which produced statements that were
legally involuntary.

For this reason, these statements must be

suppressed.
^ :•':•:: 7 3
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II.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
On December 5, 1990, in the morning hours, the body of
Carol Mabe was discovered at her place of employment, Timesaver
Industrial, Inc.

She was found by a fellow employee at about

7:00 a.m.
On January 4, 1991, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Gary Mabe,
the victim's husband, was asked by Detectives John Johnson and Chuck
Oliver to meet them at the Public Safety Building for an interview.
The initial portion of the videotaped interview involved questions
about what Mr. Mabe remembered about the morning his wife was
killed.

After some time, Mr. Mabe was informed by Detective Oliver

that they believed he had killed his wife.

Several times during the

interrogation Mr. Mabe told the detectives that he no longer wished
to talk to them. (T. 48, 71, 85)

The officers continued to press

Mr. Mabe about his involvement in his wife's death.
Through out the interrogation, Mr. Mabe denied any
involvement in or knowledge about his wife's death.

After several

hours of interrogation, Mr. Mabe asked if he was free to leave, (T.
98) then got up and left.
During the weekend, Mr. Mabe attempted suicide three
times.

First he took a bottle of over-the-counter medication, but

awoke the next day.

Second, on Sunday he took two bottles of

over-the-counter medication with a six pack of beer.

Third, he

vented the furnace into the house on Sunday night and woke up

-?

-

gagging and choking.

Monday morning, January 7, 1991, Mr. Mabe

returned to the Public Safety Building and made the statements, he
is asking the court to suppress.
III.
ARGUMENT
1.

STATEMENTS MADE BY A SUSPECT TO AGENTS OP THE
STATE MUST BE SUPPRESSED IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THEIR PRODUCTION, INCLUDING PROMISES OR
THREATS MADE BY AGENTS OF THE STATE,
DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE INVOLUNTARY.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution prohibit the use of statements involuntarily obtained
from the accused.

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).

Once the

accused challenges the voluntariness of his statements, the State
bears the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary by a
preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah

1988).
The test for voluntariness was established by the United
States Supreme Court in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
There the Court said:
"But a confession, in order to be
admissible...must not be extracted by any sort of
threat of violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the
exertion of any improper influence.. . "
Id. at 542-42.
Although Bram still retains validity, the courts have since
held that there is no automatic rule mandating the suppression of
all incriminating statements obtained by promissory inducement.

In

United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1967), cert, denied,

389 0.8.908(1967), the court stated that the clear test of
voluntariness is "whether an examination of all the circumstances
discloses that the conduct of law enforcement was such as to over
bear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions
not freely self-determined."

Jjd. at 17.

In situations where the defendant is in custody and without
counsel, Bram is strictly construed.

In United States v. Fraction,

613 F.Supp. 295 (D.C.N.J. 1985), the district court held that "a
custodial setting is highly relevant to determine how literally Bram
should be read."

Also in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742

(1970), the court held that confessions obtained by
misrepresentation of promises of leniency are not per se involuntary
if the effect of interrogation tactics is "dissipated by the
presence and advice of counsel."

However, where a confession is

taken from an unrepresented suspect in custody, "even a mild promise
of leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because
the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at
such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible impact
on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess."

_ld. at

754.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the
United States Supreme Court reiterated what it termed the "ultimate
test" of voluntariness as first applied in Culombe v. Connecticut,
376 U.S. 568 (1961):
"Is the confession the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker? . . .
If it is not, if his will has been overborne and
his capacity of self-determination critically
impaired, the use of his confession offends due
process."

Id. at 225-6.
Determining the voluntariness of a confession requires the
court to consider the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.

Schneckloth at 226, cited with

approval in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988) and State v.
Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1986).

In United States v. Shears,

762 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1985), the circuit court held that government
agents may initiate conversations on cooperation, may promise to
make defendant's cooperation known to the prosecution and may even
be able to make and breech certain promises without rendering a
resulting confession involuntary, but an important factor in
determining the voluntariness of a defendant's confession is his
perception of what the agents have promised.
The Utah Supreme Court has provided a test for
voluntariness similar to those elucidated above.

In State v. Moore,

697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985), the court held that to support a finding
that a confession is involuntary, the evidence must reveal some
"physical or psychological force or manipulation that is designed to
induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done
so."

21•

a t 236

*

Similarly in United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d

1332 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held:
A confession is involuntary whether coerced by
physical or psychological pressure . . . Law
enforcement conduct which renders a confession
involuntary does not consist only of express
threats so direct as to bludgeon a defendant into
failure of the will. Subtle psychological
coercion suffices as well, and at times more
effectively, to overbear a rational intellect and
a free will.
\'* / * c t ^ ">
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2d at 1335.

2.

STATEMENTS TAKEN FROM GARY MABE BY AGENTS OF
THE STATE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY
WERE INDUCED BY PROMISES WHICH WITHIN THE
TOTALITY OF THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INTERROGATION, AMOUNTED
TO IMPERMISSIBLE MANIPULATION.

In the case at bar, GARY MABE was subjected to physical and
psychological force which was designed to induce him to make
statements which he was not otherwise disposed to give.

This type

of manipulation is proscribed in numerous cases cited above.

During

the interrogation, Mabe was suffering from the effects of the
grieving process following the death of his wife coupled with the
effects of drinking. (T. 48.)

Detectives Jensen and Oliver took

advantage of Mabe's impaired psychological and mental condition.
During the several hours of interrogation, Detectives
Jensen and Oliver continually referred to the "Brinks deal". (T. 16,
18, 24-28, 38, 40, 42, 55, 65, 74, 76, 91, 92.)

Both detectives

were aware that Mr. Mabe had been charged with a felony theft
several years ago and that he pleaded guilty to the charge after
turning himself in. Additionally, they were aware that Mr. Mabe
spent five (5) days in the Salt Lake County Jail and was ultimately
placed on probation..

Both detectives knew that Mr. Mabe would not

be placed on probation in this case, whether or not he admitted any
involvement.

However, Detective Oliver stated, "Uh, things worked

out on that Brinks deal, you were smart enough to say, hey, I made a
mistake." (T. 42.)

He also stated, "You had the man in you to fess

up to [the Brinks deal] and things worked out for you.
work out here too, Gary." (T. 56.)

Things can

These statements created the implied promise to Mr. Mabe
that his interests would be served by confessing in this matter as
he did in the previous case and that he would receive the same
treatment.

Neither detective did anything to prevent Mr. Mabe from

placing his trust in the misleading statements made.
In United States v. Goldstein/ 611 F.Supp. 626 (D.C. 111.
1985), the district court held, quoting from Grades v. Boles, 398
F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1968), that "when the government misleads a
suspect concerning the consequences of a confession, his statements
are regarded as having been unconstitutionally induced by a
prohibited direct or implied promise." Jjd. at 632.
Because of the misrepresentations regarding the consequences of his
confession and the implied promises of leniency, Mabe's
incrimination statements should be considered involuntary and
therefore inadmissible.
3.

STATEMENTS TAKEN FROM MABE BY AGENTS OF THE
STATE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY WERE
INDUCED BY A THREAT WHICH, WITHIN THE
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, RENDER THEM
INVOLUNTARY.

Although any interview of a suspect by police will have
coercive aspects to it, the Utah Supreme Court has held in State v.
Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981), that a confession "cannot be
extracted by treats or violence or obtained by improper influences
or promises and still be deemed to be voluntary."

Ij3. at 160.

Before Mabe showed any inclination toward confessing,
Detective Oliver told him "If we have to charge you with second
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degree homicide instead of manslaughter or something then, you know,
we're going to have to do what we have to do, as you're doing what
you have to do." (T. 97.)

This type of threat was prohibited by the

Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989).

In

that case the court held involuntary a confession where the accused
was threatened with a more serious charge if he did not confess. In
Strain, the interrogating detective gave the suspect the choice
between confessing and receiving a charge of second degree murder,
or not confessing and being charged with first degree murder.

After

examining the detective's statements, the court held that they were
impermissibly coercive because "they carried the threat of greater
punishment or a promise of lesser punishment contingent upon whether
the defendant confessed."

I£.

at 226.

In the case at bar, Oliver made clear the threat of greater
punishment if Mabe did not confess:

"If we have to charge you with

second degree homicide instead of manslaughter or something, then,
you know, we're going to have to do what we have to do, as you're
doing what you have to do." (T. 97) that is, that Mr. Mabe would
receive a lesser punishment as a reward for talking.

These

statements were made to Mr. Mabe moments before he left the Public
Safety Building on Friday evening and although Mr. Mabe's confession
was not extracted until the following Monday morning, that type of
psychological force still invalidated the voluntariness of the
confession.

These threats, even if viewed as implied rather than

express, are factors which invalidate the voluntariness of the
confession and which, under the totality of the circumstances,
mandate suppression.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The Statefs burden is to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Mabe's confession was voluntary as viewed under
the totality of the circumstances.

The court must consider the

characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.

The germane considerations are the psychological and

physical condition of Mr. Mabe; the grief over losing his wife, the
effects of any alcohol use; the custodial setting; the absence of
counsel; the promises made by Detective Oliver; and the threats
which were made.

The interrogation of Mr. Mabe violated the

prohibitions against the use of psychological manipulation as set
forth in Bram and its progeny.

The interrogation violated the broad

constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee of fundamental fairness.

Clearly Mabe initially was

determined not to confess; his will to resist was systematically and
consciously overborne by the strongarm and constitutionally
unprotected tactics of Oliver and Jensen.

It is true that Mr. Mabe

did not confess until the following Monday, however, all of the
coercion did not dissipate over the weekend.

This court should

enforce the position that important human values are sacrificed
where agents of the government, in attempting to secure a
conviction, bring a confession out of an accused against his will.
Based on the forgoing, Gary Lee Mabe respectfully urges the court to
suppress the statements made by him to his interrogators.

-^.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this

21

day of May, 1991.

LYNN R. BROWN
''Attorney for Defendant

KIMBERLY CLARK
Attorney for Defendant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

day of May, 1991.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Case No. 911900193FS

v.
GARY LEE MABE,

Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
Defendant.
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress his confession in
the above-captioned matter.
held on May 20, 1991.

A hearing on defendant's motion was

The parties stipulated to the admission of

State's exhibits one and two, which are video tapes of police
interviews with the defendant.
Friday, January 4, 1991.

The first interview occurred on

The second interview occurred on Monday,

January 7, 1991.
The
interviews.

Court

has

reviewed

the

video

tapes

of

both

The Court has reviewed the psychiatric evaluation of

Dr. E. Alan Jeppsen

and the memorandum

defendant and the State.

submitted

by both the

The Court has also reviewed the testimony

of Detective John Johnson taken at the suppression hearing.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 911900193FS
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Based thereon, the Court makes the following Findings of
Fact:
1.

On January 4, 1991, the defendant was interviewed

at the Salt Lake City Police Department by detectives John Johnson
and Chuck Oliver.
death

of

December

the

The subject matter of this interview was the

defendant's

5, 1990.

wife,

Carol

Mabe, which

occurred

on

This interview lasted between two and three

hours.
2.

At the time of the interview the defendant was 38

years old and appears to be in good health.

During the interview

he did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The defendant
faculties.

appeared to be lucid and in full control of his

He had attended Boise State College for three years and

has an I.Q. of 127.

The defendant had previously entered a guilty

plea to the commission of a felony.
3.

During

the

interview

involuntarily detained or arrested.
at the end of the interview.
threatened.

the

defendant

was

never

The defendant left voluntarily

The defendant was never physically

He never asked for, or was refused the assistance of

counsel.
4.

During the interview there were suggestions that

the defendant may be charged with a more serious offense should he
refuse to cooperate and that there might be more lenient treatment

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 911900193FS
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should he cooperate.

However, the defendant made no incriminatory

statements during the interview of January 4, 1991.
5.

On Monday, January 7, 1991, the defendant contacted

Detective Johnson and requested that the detective come to his
house

and

pick

Detectives

him

Johnson

up

so

and

that

Oliver

he

could

picked

up

clear
the

up

the

defendant

transported him to the Salt Lake City Police Department.

case.
and

Nothing

was said about the homicide during the trip.
6.

At the police station, Detective Johnson gave the

defendant his Miranda warnings.
the

rights

detectives.

he

was

giving

The defendant clearly acknowledged

up

and

agreed

to

talk

with

the

The defendant appeared to understand the questions put

to him and was responsive.

The defendant confessed to killing his

wife.

He did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or

drugs.

The defendant appeared to understand what the consequences

of his confession would be.
7.

The defendant indicated that he had made attempts

at suicide over the weekend.
displays

during

the

January

This combined with his emotional
7

interview

are

consistent

with

remorsefulness and sorrow for killing his wife on December 5, 1990.
Conclusions of Law
The Court has evaluated the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the defendant's confession.

The Court finds that the
^
•>.->
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defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights under
Miranda.

The Court also finds that the defendant's confession was

voluntary and not the result of coercion, threats or promises.
The Court concludes that the State has met its burden of
proof and orders that the defendant's Motion to Suppress be denied.
735^
DATED this ^ ^ ? a v of June, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

KENNETH* RIGTRUP
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
rRT JUDGE
Approved as to Form:
#<

a.

LYNN BROWN
Attorney for the Defendant
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